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Abstract
In this paper we empirically investigate the determinants of leverage and agency problems and
we examine the relationships between leverage and agency problems. As in Titman and
Wessels (1988) we use structural equations modeling with latent variables. In contrast to
Titman and Wessels (1988), who employ data obtained from annual reports and capital
markets, we use questionnaire data to measure firm characteristics. The questions concern the
characteristics of the respondents’ firms, including the presence of agency problems. We
estimate the relations between these characteristics. The results confirm that the trade-off
between tax advantages and bankruptcy costs determines leverage. We also find free cash flow
and corporate governance characteristics as determinants of overinvestment. Despite findings
that agency problems are present, direct relationships between leverage and four agency
problems are absent.1
Introduction
Theoretical arguments suggest that the debt-equity ratio is related to agency costs. A vast and
rapidly growing literature deals with potential relations between this choice and agency
problems. Three well-known predictions prevail. First, leverage aggravates agency conflicts
between bondholders and shareholders. Frequently cited examples are the direct wealth
transfer problem, the asset substitution problem and the underinvestment problem (see Smith
and Warner (1979), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Myers (1977) respectively). Second,
leverage mitigates agency problems that arise from managerial behavior that conflicts with the
interest of shareholders. A well-known example is the overinvestment problem (see e.g. Jensen
(1986)). Finally, the relative amount of debt raises the costs of agency problems with
stakeholders like customers and employees (see e.g. Titman (1984)). However, leverage is
merely one potential factor in agency problems as the problems can be aggravated and
mitigated by numerous factors. For example, the overinvestment problem is related to free cash
flow, growth opportunities, leverage, and several corporate governance characteristics, such as
bank relationships, threat of the market for corporate control, or managerial option plans.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide an overview of the versatility of governance structures.  
We test agency theories within a framework of capital structure decisions. Our data and the
empirical method allow us (1) to distinguish between tax or bankruptcy determinants of
leverage and agency determinants; and (2) to distinguish between determinants of leverage and
determinants of agency problems. We use a unique data set for listed firms in the Netherlands,
that contains information on a broad range of firm characteristics. By means of a questionnaire
we asked financial managers for their opinion about firm characteristics. The knowledge of
these managers goes well beyond publicly available data and includes internal information, such
as the presence of agency problems. Our analysis is based upon the results of questionnaires
sent to the CFO's of the 168 non-financial firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in
May 1997. We received 102 useable questionnaires leading to a response rate of 61 percent.
Because of the high response rate, the data are likely to represent the population of non-
financial listed Dutch firms. Data extracted from responses of financial managers may suffer
from subjectivity bias. Therefore, using questionnaire data should be seen as complementary to
the use of accounting and stock market data. The trade-off is between the richer data set2
obtainable from questionnaires versus the objectivity of publicly available data.
Previous empirical studies provide tests of the relevance of agency problems in a capital
structure setting. Examples for US firms are Titman and Wessels (1988), Smith and Watts
(1992), McConnell and Servaes (1995), and Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996). Rajan and Zingales
(1995) study the determinants of capital structure for G-7 countries. Mehran (1992) and
Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) study the impact of governance characteristics on leverage.
In these studies, leverage ratios are explained by empirical proxies for theoretical determinants.
The studies test and confirm a trade-off between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs of debt.
More interesting, competing determinants are derived from the agency theories. Several factors
are expected to determine the presence of agency problems and consequently the leverage
ratio. In existing empirical studies, it is assumed that direct relations between determinants of
agency problems and leverage are caused by agency problems. This assumption creates an
inference problem. For example, growth opportunities aggravate the underinvestment problem
and increase the costs of leverage. Also, growth opportunities reduce overinvestment and thus
the need for leverage. Finally, growth opportunities are risky and intangible assets that induce
bankruptcy costs of leverage. These three hypotheses predict a negative relationship between
growth opportunities and leverage. Smith and Watts (1992), McConnell and Servaes (1995),
and Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) confirm this negative relationship. But which theories are
confirmed by this finding? The contribution of this paper is to discriminate between non-agency
and various agency explanations of relationships between firm characteristics and leverage.
We study non-financial firms, listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.  In the Netherlands
1
corporate governance structures differ from those in the Anglo-Saxon setting, which
constitutes the cradle of most corporate governance theories. A market for external corporate
control is virtually absent, while in Anglo-Saxon countries hostile takeovers prevail (see
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.756)). In the Dutch legal system firms are allowed to build up an
array of technical takeover defenses.  But, the prerequisites for an effective internal or arm-
2
length control system are in place. The prevalent mechanisms are a two-tier supervisory and
management board, large shareholdings and long-term involvement of banks.  These devices
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are likely to be more effective as compared to the United States where a mixed-tier system is
commonly in place and large shareholdings are rather uncommon  (see Shleifer and Vishny3
(1997, p.754)).  As such, the typical Dutch corporate governance system represents a clear test
whether leverage is a powerful instrument to mitigate the overinvestment problem in the
presence of internal or arm-length control mechanisms. De Jong and Veld (1998) study debt
and equity issues of Dutch firms and find that the entrenched managers choose to avoid debt.
An analysis of the abnormal returns of announcements of issues shows that shareholders
recognize the overinvestment problems in the managerial decisions.
We use questionnaire data and structural equations modeling with confirmatory factor analysis.
The structural equations model describes the relationships between the variables in our model.
The endogenous variables are leverage and the presence of four agency problems, i.e. direct
wealth transfer, asset substitution, underinvestment and overinvestment. Each of these five
endogenous variables is potentially determined by a wide set of exogenous variables and
related to a subset of the other endogenous variables. As potential determinants of leverage the
model includes variables for tax effects, bankruptcy costs, and product characteristics. As
potential determinants of the agency problems the model includes proxies for debt contract
specifications, growth opportunities, free cash flow, and corporate governance characteristics.
The variables in our structural equations model are proxies of unobservable determinants that
are derived from theory. The problem of unobservable determinants is an eminent issue in the
empirical corporate finance literature.  In our model these latent variables are approximated in
4
two steps. First, we obtain from financial managers scores on one or more questions
concerning a determinant. Second, confirmatory factor analysis modeling is used to measure
the latent variable by weighing the scores on the questions. This method allows us to reduce
respondents’ bias and to measure complicated and unobservable characteristics by asking
several simple questions. It is important to notice that the method in this paper substantially
differs from most existing studies in our field that use questionnaires. In previous papers the
questions concern the relationships between firm characteristics, while in the present paper the
relationships are estimated from the information about the characteristics.  An exception is Ang
5
and Jung (1993), who test the pecking order hypothesis by comparing scores on questions for
asymmetric information with the preferred marginal financing choices. The advantage of the
adopted approach is that respondents' bias is minimized because the respondents are not asked
to judge on the relevance of the theoretical relationships. Instead they answer questions about
plain characteristics of their firms.4
The main result of our study is that direct relations between leverage and agency problems
seem to be absent. This does not imply that the agency problems are irrelevant. Other
instruments than leverage affect agency problems. As expected, a positive relation between
free cash flow and the overinvestment problem has been found. We find that takeover barriers
intensify overinvestment, and that the presence of large shareholders increases the
overinvestment problem. We also find that share ownership by managers aligns their interest
with those of other shareholders and seems therefore an effective corporate control
mechanism. With respect to non-agency determinants of leverage we find confirmation of the
trade-off between tax advantages and bankruptcy costs. The results confirm the expected
positive impact of the marginal tax rate and the collateral value of assets, and the negative
influence of industry-specific risk. In addition, the results suggest that growth opportunities
affect leverage negatively and that this effect is due to bankruptcy costs and not due to agency
costs. We find no confirmation for the relevance of agency problems between shareholders and
bondholders. Agency problems that stem from relationships with outside stakeholders are also
not confirmed, because we find no relations between leverage and product uniqueness or the
importance of quality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section I we describe capital structure
theories and the resulting hypotheses. In Section II we explain the empirical model. In Section
III we describe the data set. In Section IV we discuss the results. Finally, Section V concludes.
I. Capital structure theories and hypotheses
In the pathbreaking paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) the debt-equity choice is irrelevant
to the value of the firm. This proposition is derived under stringent assumptions and successive
research describes factors that make capital structure decisions relevant. See for a
comprehensive overview of the literature, for example, Harris and Raviv (1991). We briefly
summarize the ideas behind the theories that we test in the present article. In addition, we
mention and discuss empirical studies and we present the hypotheses that we use to test the
theories.5
A. Taxes, bankruptcy costs, and debt 
Under the assumption of a capital market in which corporate taxation is the single market
imperfection, Modigliani and Miller (1963) show that firms prefer debt financing if interest
costs are tax-deductible. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) claim that the actual impact of the
deductibility depends on the existence of a crowding-out effect by non-debt tax shields. The
empirical implications are that an increasing marginal tax rate positively influences the relative
amount of debt and that non-debt tax shields reduce the benefits of debt. Using UK data
MacKie-Mason (1990) approximates non-debt tax shields by tax loss carry forwards and
investment tax credits. Graham (1996) uses similar proxies for the US and adds a simulated
marginal tax rate. Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) also use a simulated estimate of
marginal tax rates, but include a modification for cumulative measures of financing policy, i.e.
levels of debt and leasing.
After Modigliani and Miller (1963) a line of research emerged in which direct and indirect
bankruptcy costs are introduced. An increase of debt induces an increased probability of
distress and eventually bankruptcy. Consequently, the relative amount of debt is expected to
decrease with the failure probability and with the costs in case of financial distress or
bankruptcy. In empirical studies failure probability is frequently approximated by the variance
in earnings (e.g. Titman and Wessels (1988) and Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998))
and by measures for size (e.g. Titman and Wessels (1988)). Bankruptcy costs are estimated by
the inverse of a proxy for the collateral value of assets (e.g. Titman and Wessels (1988)).
B. Agency problems and debt
B.1 Shareholder-bondholder conflicts
In the shareholder-bondholder conflicts shareholders make decisions transferring wealth from
bondholders to shareholders. However, the bondholders are aware of the situations in which
this wealth expropriation may occur. Therefore, they will demand a higher return on their
bonds. Shareholders, foreseeing the bondholders’ reaction, can mitigate the potential conflicts.
Three potential conflicts can be distinguished: direct wealth transfer, asset substitution, and
underinvestment. In the case of direct wealth transfer conflicts, dividends are increased or debt6
with higher priority is issued (Smith and Warner (1979)). In the case of asset substitution, the
firm substitutes current projects for projects which have higher risk (Jensen and Meckling
(1976)). As the bondholders are compensated given the risk of the current projects, wealth is
transferred from bondholders to shareholders. In Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem,
growth options will not be exercised because, due to the overhang of debt, the equity needed
to finance these growth opportunities will not be provided by the shareholders. The
shareholder-bondholder conflicts can be mitigated by adjusting the properties of the debt
contract. This can take several forms. First, the contents of the debt contract can be adjusted
by including covenants (Smith and Warner (1979)). For example, a covenant can contain
restrictions on the payment of dividends or the disposition of assets. Second, debt can be
secured by collateralization of tangible assets in the debt contract (Stulz and Johnson (1985)).
Third, convertible debt or debt with warrants can be issued (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Green (1984)). Fourth, the maturity of debt can be shortened (Myers (1977)).
The empirical studies related to the shareholder-bondholder conflicts mainly focus on the
degree to which a firm can secure its debt and the firm’s growth opportunities, both in relation
to the relative amount of debt. In Titman and Wessels (1988) and Friend and Lang (1988) the
relative amount of fixed assets is used to approximate the relative amount of secured debt,
which is a potential mitigating factor of wealth distribution and asset substitution. Titman and
Wessels find no significant relationship and Friend and Lang find confirmation for the expected
positive relationship. However, it remains unclear whether this result is caused by agency
problems or, for example, by decreasing bankruptcy costs. In Titman and Wessels (1988),
Smith and Watts (1992), McConnell and Servaes (1995), and Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996)
variables are used to approximate growth opportunities, which are hypothesized to aggravate
underinvestment. The results are mixed, which is probably caused by the difficulty to measure
growth opportunities from publicly available data. Titman and Wessels (1988) do not find the
expected negative influence of proxies for growth opportunities on leverage, whereas Smith
and Watts (1992) find the predicted effect. McConnell and Servaes (1995) and Lang, Ofek,
and Stulz (1996) perform similar tests for a subsample of high-growth firms. The former study
notices a significantly negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage, while
the latter finds no relationship. In these studies the properties of the debt contract that are
mitigating factors of the underinvestment problem are not taken into account. 7
B.2 The shareholder-management conflicts
The conflicts between shareholders and management that stem from the separation of
ownership and control are introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The overinvestment
problem of Jensen (1986) is a further elaboration of their theory.  According to the
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overinvestment hypothesis, managers have incentives to cause their firm to grow beyond the
optimal size and to accept projects with a negative value to the firm. Jensen argues that
overinvestment is aggravated by more free cash flow and less growth opportunities. The
overinvestment problem can be mitigated by issuing debt and Jensen refers to this non-
discretionary nature as the disciplining role of debt. Alternative mechanisms to control
overinvestment exist. First, the managers’ income can be made dependent upon the
performance of the firm. This can be accomplished by means of managerial shareholdings or
option plans, or by compensation schemes. Second, internal and external corporate control
mechanisms may mitigate overinvestment. The internal control mechanisms include monitoring
by the board, large shareholders, or banks. An example of an external control mechanism is the
market for corporate control, which is characterized by hostile takeovers.
Several empirical studies examine the overinvestment problem by analyzing the relationship
between growth opportunities and free cash flow on the one hand, and leverage on the other.
Smith and Watts (1992) do not differentiate between overinvestment and underinvestment and
find the predicted negative relationship between debt and growth opportunities. McConnell
and Servaes (1995) amend the test by examining the overinvestment hypothesis for a sample of
low-growth firms, and include managerial shareholdings as a mitigating factor. They conclude
that the results confirm the overinvestment hypothesis. In the study of Lang, Ofek, and Stulz
(1996) the overinvestment hypothesis is also tested for a sample of low-growth firms, and a
proxy for the availability of free cash flow is included. In line with the overinvestment
hypothesis, a significantly negative relationship between debt and proxies for growth
opportunities is found. Mehran (1992) and Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) test the
influence of governance characteristics on leverage. Both studies find that alignment of
interest, through managerial shareholdings and option plans, induces leverage. As a result of
monitoring, the presence of large shareholders is found to increase leverage. Similarly,
relationships with banks induce leverage.8
B.3 Conflicts with outside stakeholders
Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) study the relationship between the capital
structure choice and outside stakeholders. Titman (1984) argues that the liquidation of a firm
may impose costs on the customers and employees. As a result they demand risk premia on
products and wages. These costs are transferred to the shareholders. However, if the
shareholders would commit to liquidate only when the gains exceed all costs, including those
of customers and employees, this would increase the cost of capital. Titman shows that capital
structure can be used to control these risk premia and argues that firms with higher liquidation
costs to customers and employees will have less debt. Titman and Wessels (1988) have
investigated the relationship between uniqueness and leverage. The expected negative
relationship is found.  Maksimovic and Titman (1991) argue that firms with products with low
7
liquidation costs to customers are also subject to a similar interaction. Firms that require a
reputation for producing high quality products are expected to have less debt. 
C. Summary of the hypotheses
In Table I we summarize our discussion. The table gives the endogenous relations between
leverage and agency constructs. 
[Please insert Table I here]
In addition, it shows the exogenous determinants of leverage and of agency problems. To
facilitate the exposure, theories of similar character are in the first column combined in five
main groups, i.e. tax effects, bankruptcy costs, shareholder-bondholder conflicts, shareholder-
manager conflicts and conflicts of managers and other stakeholders. Firm characteristics are
also mentioned in the first column. For example, tax effects are divided into the (forward-
looking) marginal tax rate and the non-debt tax shields. The hypothesized directions of
causality between leverage and other firm characteristics can be obtained from the second and
third column. A characteristic can be a determinant of leverage in a direct or in an indirect way.
The latter situation occurs when a characteristic is a determinant of an agency problem while
that agency problem is a determinant of leverage. In the second column the hypothesized
relationships between leverage and its direct determinants are mentioned. For example, tax-9
related theories hypothesize that leverage is positively affected by the marginal tax rate.
Similarly, leverage is expected to be positively influenced by the overinvestment problem. The
hypotheses concerning the relationships between agency problems and their determinants are
given in the third column. For example, the hypotheses are that the direct wealth transfer
problem is negatively affected by covenants and secured debt. In the shareholder-bondholder
conflicts leverage is a determinant of agency problems, for example due to the overhang of
debt in the underinvestment problem. It is important to notice that the table reports the
direction of causality between leverage and the agency constructs as suggested by the initial
theories. Specifically, theory suggests that firms with a before-financing overinvestment
problem will use relatively more debt as a disciplining device. The table reports a positive
influence of the overinvestment problem on leverage. Despite this straightforward prediction of
an one-way causal relation, empirically testing is difficult because a purely before-financing
overinvestment problem is practically unmeasurable. In our empirical examination we also test
for two-way relations.
II. The empirical model
The two most distinguishing characteristics of the theoretical framework in this study are the
complex set of potential relations and the presence of unobservable characteristics. To examine
this framework empirically, we employ a model that consists of two submodels. The first
submodel is a measurement model that measures unobservable characteristics or latent
variables by combining observable data or indicators. The second submodel is a testing model
that describes the set of potential relations among the latent variables. The  submodels interact
and contain parameters that are unknown to the researcher. Anderson and Gerbing (1988,
1992) and Lance, Cornwell, and Mulaik (1988) advocate to apply a two-step approach to
estimate the parameters. In the first step confirmatory factor analysis is used to measure latent
variables. The confirmatory factor analysis estimates the relationships between observable
indicators and latent variables. The approximations are based upon a weighted average of the
indicators. Tests can be carried out to examine the quality of these approximations. In the
second step a testing model is estimated to test the hypothesized relationships between the
latent variables. As an alternative to the two-step approach, a one-step approach can be used in10
which the measurement model and the testing model are estimated simultaneously (see Bollen
(1989) and Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989, 1993)).  Compared to the two-step approach, this
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one-step approach has a number of drawbacks. First, the one-step approach requires a
sufficient fit of the data with respect to the theoretical model. In case of insufficient fit, the
model has to be adjusted towards the data. The goal of the procedure is then not to test a
hypothesis, but to describe the data by a model (Cliff (1983)). Second, incorrect specifications
influence all estimates in the one-step approach. In the two-step approach the measurement
model can be evaluated before the testing model is estimated, and this latter model can be
evaluated separately (Anderson and Gerbing (1988)). Third, simultaneous testing induces
interpretational confounding, which means that a latent variable is given different empirical
meaning than would have been given by an individual before estimating unknown variables
(Anderson and Gerbing (1988)). Fornell and Yi (1992) mention a drawback of the two-step
approach, which is that the two steps are not independent. Modifications in the first step affect
the second step. In a reply, Anderson and Gerbing (1992) convincingly argue that the
specifications in both steps are not arbitrary if they are driven by theory.
An investigation of Table I leads to two additional requirements of an appropriate  elaboration
of the two-step approach. First, the presence of several dependent variables requires a
structural equations model. Second, the source of the data has to be selected appropriately.
The measurement model includes divergent firm characteristics. The data for most
characteristics cannot be obtained from the firms’ annual reports or from stock market data. If
not impossible, it is very difficult to measure, for example, agency problems or internal control
mechanisms from these sources. We use questionnaire data to provide indicators to measure
latent variables. For each latent variable in our model we ask CFOs one, two, or three
questions. The answers to these questions jointly measure a characteristic. The advantage of
questionnaire data is that they are designed to approximately describe each characteristic.
Drawbacks of questionnaire data are that different interpretation of the questions among
respondents may occur, that concepts may not be fully and equally understood, and that
managers give social desirable answers. In order to mitigate these drawbacks, we use of simple
and homogeneous  questions. Moreover, the questionnaire is anonymous.
9





In the measurement model the questionnaire data provide the indicators that are used to
measure the latent variables. Confirmatory factor analysis is used to measure the relation
between the indicators and the latent variable (see Bollen (1989) and Jöreskog and Sörbom
(1989, 1993)). The confirmatory factor analysis model is
(1)
where x is a vector of q indicators, > is a vector of s latent variables, 7  is a matrix of factor x
loadings that relate the latent variables to the indicators, and * is a column vector of
measurement errors. The correlation matrix E for the indicators is
(2)
in which M and 1  are the covariance matrices of > and *, respectively. The confirmatory *
factor analysis estimates E, such that the fit between the sample correlation matrix S and E is
maximized according to a distance function which, in general, can be interpreted as a maximum
likelihood criterium.  
10
We apply confirmatory factor analysis on separate submodels, each consisting of a set of
indicators measuring one or more variables. The choice of variables included in each model is
based upon two considerations. First, according to the ‘two-indicator rule’, for a submodel to
be identified, it is necessary to include two or more latent variables in case not more than two
indicators are related to a latent variable (see Bollen (1989, p.244)). Second, latent variables
have to be correlated, such that indicators of variables may attribute to the measurement of
other latent variables. As an approximation of the unobservable characteristics, we estimate the
factor scores between the indicators and latent variables. These factor scores for each of the
indicators are multiplied by the scores of the respondents on the indicators, to obtain the values
for the latent variables.  Missing values in the indicators are replaced by the average of the
11
scores of other respondents on the indicator.  
12
In order to evaluate the measurement models, we calculate the fit of each of the models and
measures for the validity and reliability of the latent variables (see Bollen (1989)). The model
fit is assessed by the adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) and the root mean squared residual
(RMSR). The AGFI is an indication of the covariance in the data that is explained by the
estimated model, with the degrees of freedom taken into account. The maximum value is one
and the minimum is zero. The RMSR is a measure of the average variance of the residuals. The12
value is between zero and one, with a better fit for values closer to zero. While AGFI and
RMSR measure the fit of a model, the validity and reliability of indicators and latent variables
can also be investigated. A validity statistic indicates whether the indicator or latent variable
measures what it is expected to measure. The validity of indicator i for latent variable j is
measured by the t-value of the estimate for 8 , which is the i,jth element in 7 . The validity of a ij x
latent variable j is based on the total variance extracted, and can be calculated as
(E8 ) /((E8 ) +E* ), where i runs over all indicators of the latent variable j. The reliability ij ij ij
2 2
tests show whether the results can be duplicated with similar data and procedures. The
reliability of an indicator is the R , i.e. the variance in the indicator that is accounted for by the
2
latent variable. R  is the squared correlation coefficient of a regression with the indicator as a
2
dependent variable and the construct as independent variable. To measure the reliability of a
latent variable j from the factor loadings, we calculate (E8 )/((E8 )+E* ), where i runs over ij ij ij
2 2
all indicators of the latent variable j.
B. The testing model
In this subsection we describe how we estimate the relations among leverage, the agency
problems and their respective determinants. From the hypotheses in Table I we derive a system
of equations that describes the expected relationships. We have five equations, which are
shown Table II.
[Please insert Table II here]
In the first column the explained variables of each of the five equations are given. In the second
column the explanatory variables are mentioned. The endogenous variables are in italics. The
system of equations is obtained by interpreting economic theory. Note that in this system the
number of parameters is relatively large. Theory provides potential determinants, however, the
model is likely to be too general. In order to obtain a more parsimonious model that fits the
data, we use a single-equation method. Such a method is used to estimate a system of
equations by estimating each equation separately. In small samples it is a useful alternative to a
full-information method, because the method is less sensitive to the presence of estimation
problems such as multicollinearity, errors in variables, and misspecification. For this purpose,
we can use the Ordinary Least Squares estimator since the model is a recursive system, which13
is one in which there is a unidirectional dependency among the endogenous variables. The
equations can be ordered such that the first endogenous variable is determined only by one
other endogenous variable and exogenous variables, the second determined only by the first
two endogenous variables and exogenous variables, and so forth.  Because there are no lagged
endogenous variables in the system, the Ordinary Least Squares estimator is not only
consistent, but also unbiased.
In the single-equation context we simplify each equation until all parameter estimates have
absolute t-values that exceed a particular constant. Following suggestions in Haitovsky (1969),
this is done by a series of estimations and t-tests, which we call the specification process. The
first estimation model includes all variables. After the first estimation round the variable that
has the lowest absolute t-value for its parameter estimate, is eliminated from the model. The
resulting smaller model is re-estimated and a similar elimination procedure follows. The
estimations and eliminations are stopped as soon as all t-values are larger in magnitude than the
specified value. The constant in the model is, of course, never eliminated in this process. The
single-equation method and the subsequent specification process lead to a relatively small
system of equations than can be estimated by a full-information method. This estimation
approach will lead to more efficient parameter estimates than those obtained in the single-
equation context. The system includes among the explanatory variables the endogenous
variables that are also present in the most general model and the exogenous variables that were
not eliminated in the specification process.
III. Data set
The firms in our data set are Dutch, non-financial firms that were listed on the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange in April 1997. In order to describe the Dutch institutional setting we collected
data on the firms in our data set from alternative sources. We use a data set of the Dutch
Central Bureau of Statistics (1997) that includes annual report data over 1996. We use an
annual overview of blockholdings per April 30th, 1996, from Het Financieele Dagblad (the
Dutch financial daily). By Dutch company law blockholdings have to be announced if they
exceed the 5% level. From Jaarboek Nederlandse Ondernemingen 1995/1996 we obtained the14
names of the firm’s officers as of July 1996. Also the officers of Dutch banks are included in
this book, which allows us to find board members of banks that are also board members of
other firms. From the Gids bij de Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs 1996,
which is issued by the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, we collected data on the legal structure of
the shares. In Table III we provide summary statistics of the firms. 
[Please insert Table III here]
In Table III we find that, measured in book values, the average long-term debt ratio in 1996 is
12.8%.  Using market values it is 9.5%. In the Netherlands firms have relatively concentrated
13
ownership, as on average 41.1% is owned by the three largest shareholders. Firm-bank
relationships are emphasized by the finding that 24% of the firms have a board member, who is
also a board member of a bank. Almost half of these firm have an accompanying equity stake
owned by the bank. Takeover defenses are broadly used by Dutch firms. In general, priority
shares, which 37.9% of the firms have, are a small number of shares that carry superior voting
rights, e.g. with regard to takeover attempts. The 60.4% of the firms that have preferred
shares, have an arrangement which allows an issue of preferred shares without further approval
of shareholders and for which only 25% of the nominal value has to be paid up. In case of a
takeover attempt, the firm can place these shares with a befriended party and have the shares
paid with a loan. The dilution creates an effective takeover defense. Depository receipts are
used by 37.2% of the firms. For these firms, shareholders own receipts which only carry the
cashflow rights. The voting rights remain with a trust that owns the shares and issued the
receipts. Finally, 7% of the firms have limited voting power, which is normally 1%. This
implies that shareholders can have a maximum of 1% of all votes, irrespective of the number of
shares they possess.
Our initial sample consists of 168 firms. We aimed to have the questionnaire filled in by the
firm’s CFO. We started by contacting each firm by telephone to obtain the correct address and
the name of the CFO. If the name of the CFO could not be found, the questionnaire was sent
to the CEO. The questionnaire was completed anonymously. We ensured anonymity by using
separate return envelopes for the questionnaire and the form for the respondents name,
position, and address to obtain the results of the research.  In order to maximize the response
1415
a cover letter informed the recipients about the research project, that responses would kept
anonymously and that the completed questionnaire would be kept in total confidence.
Moreover, a research report was promised to those who filled in the separate form containing
information on the respondent. The questions deal with firm characteristics of which we expect
the respondent to have sufficient knowledge about. We use words which are understood and
used by the respondents. We avoid indistinct concepts and provide definitions if necessary. In
April 1997 we sent the questionnaires to the firms on the mailing list.  In May we sent follow-
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up questionnaires excluding the firms from the mailing list that had requested to be informed
about the results. In total, 102 questionnaires were returned.  This is a response rate of 61%.
16
This rate compares favorably with response rates on other surveys. Scott and Johnson (1982)
and Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) have response rates of 21% and 35%, respectively. For the
102 questionnaires and the 37 questions we have used, the percentage of missing values is
1.07%. The surveys were sent back within three months from the first mailing. Thus, the
surveys were completed in the same time frame and the answers are not biased by differences
in the economic environment.
IV. Results
A. Results of the measurement models
In the first step of our analysis we measure the latent variables from the questionnaire data.
The results are presented in Table IV.
[Please insert Table IV here]
In the first column the eight measurement models that we have estimated are mentioned. They
are indicated by the symbols A through H. In the second column the latent variables in each
model are mentioned. The third column gives the indicators, i.e. brief descriptions of the
questions in the questionnaire. The fourth column provides the average and standard deviations
of the scores on the individual questions. The first three columns show that two latent variables
are measured by three indicators (free cash flow and covenants), that five latent variables are16
measured by two indicators (non-debt tax shields, firm-specific risk, growth opportunities,
asset substitution, and underinvestment), and the remainder of the latent variables determines
one indicator.  No indicator is related to multiple latent variables. Latent variables that are
17
heterogeneous are related to two or three indicators, each measuring a homogeneous aspect of
the variable. For example, a firm’s non-debt tax shield consists of carry forwards and
depreciation. Most of the heterogeneous variables were found to determine the related
indicators.  The estimated coefficients are in the fifth column. All t-values are significant at the
18
5% level and 8 in every case has the expected sign. The measurement errors are in the sixth i
column. The reliability of the indicators is in the seventh column. The R ’s show that the
2
reliability of the indicators is acceptable. The AGFI and the RMSR assess the fit of the models,
and are presented in Table V.
[Please insert Table V here]
The AGFI (in column 3) shows that the fit of the models is good, as a large part of the
covariance in the data is explained by the model. The RMSR (in column 4) is also good,
because the variance of the residuals that is not explained by the model is small. The validity
and reliability of the latent variables are presented in columns 5 and 6. It can be concluded that
all latent variables have an acceptable reliability. The validity is reasonable given the fairly small
number of indicators for the variables. As a result of the measurement model, for each firm,
estimates of the latent variables for each firm are obtained by multiplying the indicators with
their respective estimated scores.
B. Results of the testing model
In the second step of our analysis we measure the relationships between the latent variables. 
Before we discuss the results of the regressions, we investigate the correlations between the
latent variables. The correlations are given in Table VI.
[Please insert Table VI here]
Particularly interesting are the correlations among the agency conflicts. A positive correlation17
exists between the shareholder-bondholder conflicts. The correlation between wealth transfer
with dividends and asset substitution equals 0.70. The correlation between asset substitution
and underinvestment is 0.50 and the correlation between wealth transfer with dividends and
underinvestment is 0.46. Interesting is the negative correlation between underinvestment and
overinvestment (-0.40), which confirms the contrarian nature of these problems. The
correlations between wealth distribution with debt seniority and the other agency problems are
not significant at the 1% level.  Furthermore, the nature of growth opportunities, i.e
19
intangibility and uncertainty, is accentuated by the negative correlation with the collateral value
(-0.75) and the positive correlation with industry-specific risk (0.47).
In the testing model we initially estimate single-equation models. The variables in each of the
models are described in Table II. We standardize each variable by dividing it by its standard
deviation. This transformation aids the interpretation of the coefficients, as all variables are
denominated at the same scale. It allows to access the relative effects on a regressand of
changing each of the variables one standard deviation. Initially, we exclude endogenous
constructs from the independent constructs. We use the results to build a structural equations
model. The Ordinary Least Squares estimation results of the single-equation models are
presented in Table VII. 
[Please insert Table VII here]
In Panel A determinants of leverage are uncovered. Leverage is defined as the ratio of the
book value of long-term debt and the book value of the firm’s total assets. In the left column
the variables are given. In column 1 the results of a regression with all variables is shown.
Between parentheses are the t-values. Columns 2 and 3 show the results of the regression
models are given that include only variables with parameter estimates that are significant at the
10% and 5% level, respectively. The more parsimonious models are obtained after applying a
stepwise elimination procedure. The last row of Panel A contains the adjusted coefficients of
determination, R .  
2
The results for the determinants of leverage show strong confirmation of the non-agency trade-
off model. First, the results suggest that the marginal tax rate has a positive impact on18
leverage. Moreover, the hypothesis that collateral value is positively related to debt, is
confirmed by the data. This suggests an inverse relationship between bankruptcy costs and
leverage. Also, the coefficient for industry-specific risk is significant at the 10% level, which
suggests that an increasing bankruptcy probability affects leverage negatively. Our results are
similar to the results of Rajan and Zingales (1995) for the G7-countries. They use proxies for
collateral value and size, which are found to be positively related to leverage. Although Titman
and Wessels (1988) do not find significant results for the relationship between leverage and
tangibility or volatility, the signs of the estimates generally confirm the trade-off. In our model,
no confirmation is found for the hypotheses concerning non-debt tax shields, uniqueness, and
importance of quality. In contrast with our findings, Titman and Wessels (1988) find a
significantly negative relationship between uniqueness and leverage.  The importance of
20
quality does not seem to matter. We are not aware of other empirical studies in which the
relationship between importance of quality and leverage is tested. Investigating the R  shows
2
that the explanatory power of the models is relatively high, with R 's ranging between 0.28 and
2
0.30.
In Panel B the results for the determinants of the agency problems are described. The
regressions in which the shareholder-bondholder agency problems are the dependent variables
lead to the conclusion that in our sample the determinants hardly have any explanatory power.
The wealth transfer problem of paying excess dividends is positively related to covenants at the
5% level. This result contrasts with the hypothesis. For the wealth transfer problem concerning
the seniority of debt no significant coefficients are found. The asset substitution problem has a
significantly positive relationship with covenants at the 5% level. Similar to the wealth
distribution problem with dividends, this finding contrasts with the hypothesis. If we consider
the expected sign of the estimated parameters of these three models, the hypothesis is that they
are all negative (except the intercept). Although insignificant, the hypothesis is confirmed only
in two cases, both regarding convertible debt. In line with these findings, the R 's show that the
2
explanatory power for these determinants is very low. We conjecture that the high level of
entrenchment of the management and the relatively low managerial shareholdings cause the
absence of agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. Shareholders need to
persuade the management to expropriate wealth from bondholders, but the management has
neither the incentives nor feels the pressure to do so.19
In the empirical literature much attention is paid to the underinvestment problem, and the
emphasis is on the role of growth opportunities. Growth opportunities are hypothesized to
aggravate underinvestment. On the other hand, several properties of the debt contract may
mitigate underinvestment. In our results, only the hypothesis that increasing short-term debt
mitigates underinvestment is confirmed at the 5% level. In contrast with our expectations,
covenants are found to be positively related to the underinvestment problem. A remarkable
result in our analysis is that the parameter estimate of growth opportunities is insignificant and
negative. These findings contrast with Smith and Watts (1992) and McConnell and Servaes
(1995). 
The final regressions in Panel B deal with the overinvestment problem. This agency problem
between managers and shareholders is expected to be aggravated by free cash flow. The results
confirm Jensen’s (1986) ideas that overinvestment is positively affected by free cash flow. A
similar result is obtained by Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996). Our analysis provides interesting
information about the mitigating factors. First, no confirmation of the mitigating role of growth
opportunities is found. In contrast, Smith and Watts (1992), McConnell and Servaes (1995),
and Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) confirm the mitigating role of growth opportunities. Second,
the results show strong confirmation of the expected negative impact of managerial
shareholdings. For performance-based income the result is again negative, but insignificant. It
is remarkable that the coefficient for option plans is positive and relatively large in magnitude.
This indicates that options do not align the interests of managers and shareholders, as they may
aggravate overinvestment. Further investigation about the nature of the option plans learns that
often option are exercised within three years and that the structure is fiscally driven. Mehran
(1992) and Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) find that both managerial shareholdings and
option plans increase leverage. The latter finding may be due to a tendency of managers with
options to increase risk by leveraging. Third, the less the firm is exposed to the market for
corporate control, the larger the overinvestment problem. This result was expected and is due
to the effectiveness of the technical takeover defenses that characterize the Dutch institutional
setting. Finally, the role of banks shows to be insignificant and a positive relationship between
block holdings and overinvestment is found. This result indicates that arm-length and internal
monitoring do not reduce or even induce overinvestment. The finding that blockholdings
induce overinvestment has three potential reasons. First, blockholders that were expected to20
monitor the management are passive monitors and a threat to sell the sales may be implausible
due to liquidity costs. Second, blockholders actively force the management to engage in
projects with negative value to all shareholders, but with a positive value to blockholders. As
Becht (1997) argues, strong blockholders may squeeze weak minority shareholders. Third,
blockholdings serve as takeover barrier, because blockholders may have strategic interests and
do not allow rival firms to take over the firm. This argument is supported by Kabir, Cantrijn,
and Jeunink (1997), in which a negative relation between technical takeover barriers and
blockholdings is reported for the Netherlands. In contrast with our findings, Mehran (1992)
and Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) find evidence on effective monitoring by large
shareholders in the US. The relevance of the model is reflected by R 's that range from 0.16 to
2
0.22.
The results that have been discussed so far present strong confirmation for the
taxes/bankruptcy trade-off model to determine leverage. Although we have analyzed the
structure of the agency problems that are related to debt, we have not yet tested the impact of
these problems on leverage. In order to do this, we define a structural equations model. Hence,
this model includes two types of latent variables that are related to leverage, i.e. agency
problems and the constructs from the taxes/bankruptcy trade-off model that have significant
parameter estimates. The requirement for an agency problem to be included in the structural
equations model is to have acceptable explanatory power from the exogenous variables. In our
model we include underinvestment and overinvestment, and the exogenous variables of these
investment problems that have significant parameter estimates.  An exception is the inclusion
21
of growth opportunities. To enable a comparison of our model with existing empirical studies
this variable is included.  
The results of the structural equations model are presented in Table VIII. 
[Please insert Table VIII here]
The structural model shows that the conclusions related to the taxes/bankruptcy trade-off
model do not change if the underinvestment and overinvestment problems are allowed to affect
leverage. The parameter estimates for the marginal tax rate and collateral are similar to the21
estimates in the single-equation context. Also the determinants of the agency problems remain
unchanged if the 10% significance level is applied. An interesting result in Table VIII is the
measurement of the overhang of debt in the underinvestment problem. Myers’ (1977)
hypothesis predicts a positive sign, but the parameter estimate for leverage is insignificant at all
conventional significance levels. Another interesting finding is the estimate for the disciplining
role of debt. Jensen (1986) predicts a positive relationship between overinvestment and
leverage. The results are, however, insignificant at all conventional significance levels. This
finding confirms the results of De Jong and Veld (1998), who study incremental debt-equity
decisions and find that overinvestment is relevant but not related to the disciplining role of
debt. Our results also suggest that the relationship with growth opportunities is insignificant
for both agency problems. This result is interesting, because in existing empirical studies these
agency problems are often found to be present. Examples are Smith and Watts (1992),
McConnell and Servaes (1995), and Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996). It seems puzzling that in
these studies the underinvestment and overinvestment are found to be relevant in explaining the
firms debt ratios. A potential explanation is that they employ a reduced-form analysis in which
the relationship between leverage and growth opportunities is estimated without modeling
agency problems and bankruptcy costs explicitly. Note that the costs are increased by growth
opportunities, which are in general noncollaterizable and risky assets. In our framework we are
able to disentangle the effects that growth opportunities have on underinvestment,
overinvestment and bankruptcy costs.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we use questionnaire data and confirmatory factor analysis with structural
equation modeling to investigate the relevance of agency theories. We measure the
relationships between leverge and agency problems and the determinants of leverage and
agency problems, for a data set of Dutch listed firms. The use of questionnaire data allows us
to include variables that are only available from internal sources. We are able to construct good
approximations of theoretical determinants, which allows a powerful and unique examination
of determinants of leverage and agency problems. We can explicitly include agency problems in
the empirical specification of the model. 22
The institutional setting in the Netherlands is interesting, because firms can protect themselves
with technical takeover defenses from the disciplinary forces of the threat of hostile takeovers
as an external control mechanism. Therefore, overinvestment is potentially relevant and the
Dutch setting offers a unique case to test the influence of this agency problem. It is an
empirical question to what extent this problem is alleviated by the disciplining role of leverage
or by alternative corporate control mechanisms. 
In this paper, we show that the level of leverage in the Netherlands is largely determined by
factors from the taxes/bankruptcy trade-off model. On the one hand, the expected effect of tax
benefits is confirmed as leverage increases with the marginal tax rate. On the other hand, the
impact of bankruptcy costs is relevant, as we find that leverage decreases with risk and
increases with collateral. Because growth opportunities also induce bankruptcy costs, this
determinant is part of the  trade-off model. Agency problems are only insignificantly related to
leverage. This does not imply that agency problems are absent in the Netherlands, because
other factors may be involved. This particularly holds for the overinvestment problem, which is
caused by free cash flow and the absence of the market for corporate control. The latter
determinant is related to the Dutch institutional setting in which firms are allowed to have
multiple technical anti-takeover barriers. The disciplining role of debt is not found in the data.
Managerial shareholdings are found to mitigate overinvestment. The presence of large
shareholders induces overinvestment, but the precise role of these blockholders remains
unclear. We find no results that show the relevance of agency problems between shareholders
and bondholders, and we conjecture that the entrenchment of the managers drives this finding.
The agency problems from relationships with outside stakeholders are not confirmed, because
we find no relations between leverage and product uniqueness or the importance of quality.23
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Table I: Theoretical relations 
         Expected relationships
(1) Theories and determinants (2) Determinants (3) Determinants of
                  of leverage               agency problems
Tax effects
# marginal tax rate positive
# non-debt tax shields negative
Bankruptcy costs
# collateral value of assets positive
# business risk negative
Shareholder vs bondholder conflicts
# direct wealth transfer problem
• leverage  positive
• covenants  negative
• secured debt negative
• convertible debt negative
• short-term debt  negative
# asset substitution problem
• leverage  positive
• covenants  negative
• secured debt negative
• convertible debt negative
• short-term debt   negative
# underinvestment problem 
• leverage  positive
• growth opportunities  positive
• covenants  negative
• secured debt negative
• convertible debt negative
• short-term debt   negative
Shareholder vs manager conflicts
# overinvestment problem  positive
• free cash flow positive
• growth opportunities  negative
• managerial incentive structure negative
• control structure negative
Managers and claimants vs other stakeholders
# uniqueness  negative
# importance of quality negative28
Table I: Theoretical relations (continued)
Note: Table I shows a summary of the empirical prediction of capital structure theories. The
column denoted by the symbol (1) gives the five main groups of theories. Each group is
divided into main components of the model, which can be either determinants of leverage or
determinants of agency problems. The column indicated by (2) describes the hypotheses about
the relationships between leverage and determinants of leverage. The column denoted by (3)
gives the hypotheses about the relationships between the agency problems and the
determinants of these problems.29
Table II: Structural model
Explained variable  † † Explanatory variables
Leverage    † marginal tax rate, non-debt tax shields, collateral value of
assets, business risk, overinvestment, uniqueness, and
importance of quality
Wealth transfer   † leverage, covenants, secured debt, convertible debt, and
short-term debt
Asset substitution   † leverage, covenants, secured debt, convertible debt, and
short-term debt
Underinvestment   † leverage, growth opportunities, covenants, secured debt,
convertible debt, and short-term debt
Overinvestment   † free cash flow, growth opportunities, managerial
shareholdings (managerial incentive structure), performance-
based income (managerial incentive structure), managerial
option plans (managerial incentive structure), market for
corporate control (control structure), bank monitoring
(control structure), asymmetric information (control
structure), and block holdings (control structure)
Note: This table provides a summary of the relations in the structural equations model. It
shows the variables to be explained and explanatory variables. Endogenous variables are in
italics and exogenous variables are in regular font style. The variables are similar or derived
from the determinants mentioned in Table I. In parentheses we give descriptions of
determinants from which those variables have been derived.30
Table III: Public data for Dutch listed firms
Standard
Variable       Average deviation
Capital structure
long-term debt / total assets 0.128  (0.110)
long-term debt / firm value 0.095 (0.095)
short-term debt / total debt 0.776 (0.179)
convertible debt (% of firms) 7.0%
Balance sheet and stock market data
sales NLG 4381 m  (14573)
total assets NLG 3533 m (13281)
firm value NLG 5903 m (22422)
taxes / earnings before taxes 0.219 (0.390)
non-debt tax shields / total assets 0.050 (0.066)
depreciation / total assets 0.054 (0.030)
Tobin’s Q 1.644 (0.945)
market-to-book ratio 1.711 (0.956)
three-year growth in sales 0.106 (0.124)
tangible assets / total assets 0.343 (0.188)
operating income / total assets 0.097 (0.069)
Ownership structure (% of shares)
largest blockholdings 27.3% (21.7)
two largest blockholdings 36.7% (26.2)
three largest blockholdings 41.1% (26.9)
all blockholdings 48.4% (28.7)
managerial blockholdings 6.13% (16.5)
institutional blockholdings 10.9% (12.1)
Bank relationships (% of firms)
bankers on the board 24.0%
bankers on the board with blockholdings  11.6%




limited voting power 7.0%31
Table III: Public data for Dutch listed firms (continued)
Note: Annual report data are from an electronic data set of the Dutch Central Bureau of
Statistics (see also Central Bureau of Statistics (1997)). Total assets is the book value of total
assets. Firm value is the book value of total assets minus the book value of common equity
plus the market value of common equity. Non-debt tax shields are defined as in Titman and
Wessels (1988, p.4). Tobin’s Q is simulated in accordance with the second technique in Perfect
and Wiles (1994, p.329). We use an annual overview of blockholdings per April 30th, 1996,
from Het Financieele Dagblad, the Dutch financial daily. Blockholdings are cashflow rights,
with a minimum of 5%. Managerial shareholdings include shares possessed by the board of
directors and the supervisory board. From Jaarboek Nederlandse Ondernemingen 1995/1996
we obtained the  names of board members of the firms and Dutch bank as of July 1996. The
variable for bankers on the board represents the percentage of firms with at least one board
member who is also a board member of a bank. The Gids bij de Prijscourant van de
Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs 1996 provides data on priority shares, preferred shares (less than
25% of the nominal value placed), depository receipts, and limited voting power rules. The
number of observations is 129. On december 31st 1996 NLG 1 equals about USD 0.575.32
Table IV: Results of confirmatory factor analysis
(1) Model (2) Latent variable  (3) Indicator (4) Average (5) 8 8 (t-value) (6) * * (t-value) (7) R
2
  score (st.dev.)
(A) (1)  leverage       leverage (long term debt over total assets) 3.66 (2.64) - - -
(17) convertible debt       convertible debt (and warrant bond loans) 0.16 (0.37) - - -
(18) short-term debt short-term debt (short term debt over total debt)  10.38 (5.61) - - -
(B) (7) marginal tax rate marginal tax rate 4.01 (1.85) - - -
(8) non-debt tax shields non-debt tax shields from carry forwards 3.28 (1.97) 0.38 (2.75) 0.86 (6.06) 0.14
non-debt tax shields from depreciation 4.58 (1.43) 0.61 (3.35) 0.63 (2.95) 0.37
(C) (9) firm-specific risk volatility profits 3.45 (1.52) 0.83 (5.86) 0.32 (1.63) 0.68
volatility sales 3.26 (1.15) 0.69 (5.32) 0.52 (3.43) 0.69
(10) industry-specific risk industry risk 4.28 (1.69) - - -
(12) uniqueness (customers) uniqueness towards customers 3.97 (1.79) - - -
(13) uniqueness (employees) uniqueness towards employees 3.38 (1.43) - - -
(14) importance of quality importance of quality 3.92 (1.55) - - -
(D) (19) growth opportunities growth opportunities from R&D  4.19 (1.79) 0.33 (2.27) 0.89 (6.10) 0.11
growth opportunities from marketing  4.71 (1.40) 0.54 (2.67) 0.71 (3.26) 0.29
(11) collateral value collateral value 5.04 (1.62) - - -
(E) (20) free cash flow free cash flow (projects) 5.56 (1.28) 0.49 (4.22) 0.76 (6.08) 0.24
free cash flow (liquid assets) 3.15 (1.85) 0.78 (5.75) 0.39 (2.18) 0.61
free cash flow (internal funds) 4.21 (1.70) 0.64 (5.11) 0.59 (4.23) 0.41
(F) (21) managerial shareholdings managerial shareholdings 2.51 (1.81) - - -
(22) performance-based income impact of performance on managerial income 2.99 (1.69) - - -
(23) managerial option plans managerial option plans 2.80 (1.82) - - -
(24) asymmetric information asymmetric information 5.04 (1.24) - - -
(25) block holdings block holdings 4.55 (1.98) - - -
(26) bank monitoring relationships with house banks 5.94 (1.26) - - -
(27) market corporate control (threat) market corporate control (threat) 3.26 (1.66) - - -
(28) market corporate control (barriers) market corporate control (barriers) 3.26 (2.03) - - -
(G) (15) covenants covenants on dividends 2.20 (1.49) 0.73 (7.35) 0.47 (4.83) 0.53
covenants on contracts 3.43 (1.92) 0.76 (7.68) 0.43 (4.38) 0.57
covenants on investments 2.61 (1.56) 0.71 (7.20) 0.49 (5.00) 0.51
(16) secured debt secured debt 3.20 (1.92) - - -
(H) (2) wealth transfers (dividends) direct wealth transfer with dividends  2.35 (1.56) - - -
(3) wealth transfers (seniority) direct wealth transfer with seniority 3.68 (1.48) - - -
(4) asset substitution asset substitution (problem) 3.19 (1.39)  0.71 (2.81) 0.49 (1.43) 0.51
asset substitution (distress) 2.20 (1.37) 0.25 (1.96) 0.94 (6.76) 0.06
(5) underinvestment underinvestment (problem) 2.67 (1.64) 0.45 (3.55) 0.80 (5.85) 0.20
underinvestment (distress) 3.94 (1.62) 0.73 (4.50) 0.47 (2.19) 0.53
(6) overinvestment overinvestment 4.19 (1.52) - - -33
Table IV: Results of confirmatory factor analysis (continued)
Note: In column 1 the eight confirmatory factor analysis models are mentioned, which are
denoted by A through H. In column 2 the numbers and the descriptions of the latent variables
are given. In column 3 the questions in the questionnaire, which are used as indicators, are
summarized. In column 4 averages and standard deviations of the raw scores are provided.
Note that indicators are measure on a 1-7 scale, exceptions are leverage (1-20), short-term
debt (1-20), and convertible debt (0-1). In column 5 the estimates for 8 and their t-values are
given. The 8’s represent the relationship between the indicator and the latent variables. Column
6 provides the error terms * (and their t-values) of the relationships between the indicators and
the latent variables. In column 7 the R ‘s are given, which represent the parts of the variances
2
in the indicators that are explained by the latent variables.34
Table V: Statistics of confirmatory factor analysis
(1) Model  (2) Latent variable (3) AGFI   (4) RMSR   (5) Validity (6) Reliability
(B) non-debt tax shields -  -    0.26 0.40
(C) firm-specific risk 0.77  0.045    0.58 0.73
(D) growth opportunities -  -    0.20 0.32
(E) free cash flow -  -    0.42 0.68
(G) covenants 0.89  0.12      0.54 0.78
(H) asset substitution 0.90  0.049    0.28 0.39
(H) underinvestment 0.90  0.049    0.37 0.52
Note: In column 1 the confirmatory factor analysis model of which the latent variables are part,
are mentioned. In column 2 the names of the latent variables are given. The names of the latent
variables correspond to those in Table IV. In column 3 the adjusted goodness-of-fit indices
(AGFI) are provided. In column 4 the root mean squared residuals (RMSR) are given.
Columns 5 and 6 provide the validity and the reliability, respectively, as discussed in Section
II.B. The symbol ‘-’ indicates that no degrees of freedom are left to calculate AGFI and
RMSR.35
Table VI: Correlations between latent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
leverage wealth div wealth sen asset under over marg tax ndts risk firm risk indus collateral uniquecust uniqueemp quality
(1) leverage 1.00
(2) wealth div -0.06 1.00
(3) wealth sen -0.06 -0.12 1.00
(4) asset -0.05 0.70 -0.22 1.00
(5) under 0.08 0.46 -0.11 0.50 1.00
(6) over 0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 -0.40 1.00
(7) marg tax 0.50 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.16 -0.05 1.00
(8) ndts 0.39 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.78 1.00
(9) risk firm 0.01 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.28 -0.16 0.09 0.22 1.00
(10) risk indus -0.27 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.04 -0.17 -0.05 0.08 1.00
(11) collateral 0.37 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.31 0.31 -0.03 -0.24 1.00
(12) uniquecust -0.05 -0.23 0.07 -0.25 -0.22 0.12 -0.09 0.00 -0.23 -0.02 0.06 1.00
(13) uniqueemp 0.15 0.09 -0.08 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.12 -0.04 0.22 0.26 1.00
(14) quality 0.02 -0.24 -0.24 -0.08 -0.16 0.23 0.01 -0.10 -0.35 0.21 0.04 0.23 0.04 1.00
(15) covenants -0.10 0.22 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.06 -0.09 -0.07 0.05 0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.19 -0.15
(16) secured -0.13 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.04 -0.13 -0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.12 -0.02
(17) convertible 0.14 -0.13 0.09 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.22 0.20 0.14 -0.13 0.08 -0.01 0.12 -0.15
(18) short debt -0.34 0.12 0.04 0.06 -0.20 -0.07 -0.28 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 0.04 -0.24 -0.15
(19) gr_options -0.36 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.03 -0.36 -0.29 0.05 0.47 -0.75 0.00 -0.05 0.11
(20) free cf -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.04 -0.28 0.21 -0.31 -0.28 -0.30 -0.18 -0.18 0.08 -0.08 0.08
(21) mgt_share -0.04 0.34 0.04 0.30 0.21 -0.16 -0.06 -0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.10 -0.04 0.13 0.01
(22) mgt_option 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.15 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.09 -0.05 -0.12 -0.02 0.01 0.02
(23) mgt_perf -0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.18 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.14 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 0.09 -0.14
(24) as info 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.08 -0.08 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.03 0.05
(25) blockh -0.02 0.14 0.27 0.17 0.01 0.20 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.13 -0.03
(26) bank -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.17 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.00
(27) mcc threat -0.08 0.04 -0.09 0.13 0.33 -0.22 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.30 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.07
(28) mcc barr’s -0.06 -0.20 0.02 -0.14 -0.10 -0.19 -0.10 -0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.0436
Table VI: Correlations between latent variables (continued)
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
covenants secured convertible short debt gr_options free cf mgt_share mgt_option mgt_perf as info blockh bank mcc threat mcc barr’s
(15) covenants 1.00
(16) secured 0.52 1.00
(17) convertible -0.15 -0.09 1.00
(18) short debt -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 1.00
(19) gr_options 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.10 1.00
(20) free cf -0.05 -0.04 -0.14 -0.07 0.07 1.00
(21) mgt_share 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.11 1.00
(22) mgt_option -0.12 -0.24 0.10 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.35 1.00
(23) mgt_perf -0.04 -0.10 0.07 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.67 1.00
(24) as info -0.16 -0.01 0.23 -0.16 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.09 1.00
(25) blockh 0.12 0.15 -0.19 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.10 -0.04 0.07 0.27 1.00
(26) bank 0.15 0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 -0.06 0.06 0.11 -0.03 1.00
(27) mcc threat 0.04 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 0.15 -0.17 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.03 1.00
(28) mcc barr’s -0.03 0.18 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 1.00
Note: The numbers in parentheses followed by the abbreviations of the latent variables 
(in the upper row and the left column) correspond with the numbers in Table IV. The 
number of observations is 102. 37
Table VII: Regression results
Panel A: determinants of leverage
Leverage (1) (2) (3)
intercept  0.192  ( 0.34)  0.226  ( 0.54) -0.293  (-0.98)
marginal tax rate    0.392  ( 2.67)***  0.408  ( 4.65)***  0.423  ( 4.79)***
non-debt tax shields  0.013  ( 0.09)
collateral value  0.188  ( 1.99)**  0.211  ( 2.36)**  0.243  ( 2.75)***
firm-specific risk -0.025  (-0.26)
industry-specific risk -0.163  (-1.74)* -0.150  (-1.74)*
uniqueness (customers) -0.074  (-0.79)
uniqueness (employees)  0.099  ( 1.07)
importance of quality  0.048  ( 0.49)
R  0.28  0.30  0.29
2
Panel B: determinants of the agency problems
Wealth transfer (dividends) (1) (2) (3)
intercept  0.763  ( 2.36)**  1.004 ( 4.23)***  1.004 ( 4.23)***
covenants   0.173  ( 1.51)  0.225 ( 2.31)**  0.225 ( 2.31)**
secured debt  0.093  ( 0.82)
convertible debt -0.098  (-1.00)
short-term debt  0.131  ( 1.35)
R  0.05  0.04  0.04
2
Wealth transfer (seniority) (1) (2) (3)
intercept  2.063  ( 6.22)***
covenants   0.043  ( 0.37)
secured debt  0.138  ( 1.18)
convertible debt  0.107  ( 1.06)
short-term debt  0.053  ( 0.53)
R  0.00
2
Asset substitution (1) (2) (3)
intercept  0.763  ( 2.36)**  2.110  (8.82)***
covenants   0.149  ( 1.28)  0.185  (1.88)*
secured debt  0.062  ( 0.53)
convertible debt -0.063  (-0.63) 
short-term debt  0.074  ( 0.75)
R  0.01  0.02
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Table VII: Regression results (continued)
Underinvestment (1) (2) (3)
intercept  2.015  ( 6.13)***  1.985  ( 6.45)***    2.377  (11.52)***
growth opportunities -0.077  (-0.78)
covenants   0.171  ( 1.48)  0.166  ( 1.71)*
secured debt -0.003  (-0.03)
convertible debt -0.001  (-0.01)
short-term debt -0.183  (-1.85)* -0.191  (-1.96)* -0.203  (-2.08)**
R  0.03  0.05  0.03
2
Overinvestment (1) (2) (3)
intercept  2.731  ( 3.78)***  2.599 ( 5.64)***  2.174  ( 5.51)***
free cash flow  0.199  ( 2.08)**  0.217 ( 2.31)**  0.246  ( 2.62)***
growth opportunities  0.080  ( 0.84)
managerial shareholdings -0.246  (-2.31)** -0.201 (-2.15)** -0.203 ( -2.16)**
performance-based income -0.202  (-1.52)
managerial option plans  0.161  ( 1.14)
market c. control threat -0.190  (-1.97)** -0.163 (-1.74)*
market c. control barriers -0.170  (-1.82)* -0.179 (-1.94)* -0.182 (-1.96)**
bank monitoring -0.021  (-0.22)
asymmetric information  0.032  ( 0.32)
block holdings  0.232  ( 2.33)**  0.211 ( 2.27)**  0.225 (2.40)**
R  0.22  0.19  0.16
2
Note: The regressions in column 1 include all explained variables (underlined) and explanatory
variables. The endogenous variables are in italics and the exogenous variables are in normal
characters. The coefficients and the t-values (in parentheses) are reported. Stepwise deletion of
the variables with the lowest absolute t-value was used. As a result, the regressions in column
2 and 3 only include exogenous variables the are significantly related at 10% and 5% level
respectively. The symbol ‘***’ denotes that the estimate is significant at the 1% level (t>2.57).
The symbol ‘**’ denotes 5% significance level (t>1.96) and ‘*’ denotes 10% significance level
(t>1.65). The number of observations is 102.  39
Table VIII: Results of the structural equations model
Leverage
intercept  0.05 ( 0.10)
marginal tax rate  0.41 ( 4.41)***
collateral value  0.21 ( 2.19)**
industry-specific risk -0.15 (-1.68)*




intercept  2.05 ( 5.21)***
leverage  0.01 ( 0.10)
growth opportunities -0.08 (-0.69)
covenants   0.15 ( 1.48)




intercept  2.72 ( 5.44)***
growth opportunities  0.08 ( 0.87)
free cash flow  0.20 ( 2.05)**
managerial shareholdings -0.24 (-2.31)**
market c. control threat -0.19 (-1.93)*
market c. control barriers -0.17 (-1.77)*
block holdings  0.24 ( 2.44)**
R  0.19
2
Note: In the structural equations model explained variables are underlined and the explanatory
variables are not. The endogenous variables are in italics and the exogenous variables are in
regular font style. The coefficients and the t-values (in parentheses) are reported. The symbol
‘***’ denotes that the estimate is significant at the 1% level (t>2.57). The symbol ‘**’ denotes
5% significance level (t>1.96) and ‘*’ denotes 10% significance level (t>1.65). The number of
observations is 102. 40
Appendix: The questionnaire  
Note: The sequence of the questions is adapted to the sequence of the indicators in column (3)
of Table IV. The questions are translated from Dutch.
(A)
Leverage: “The debt ratio is debt with a time to maturity of more than one year divided by total assets. What is in
your firm the debt ratio (measured in book values)?” (20 intervals, from 0-4 till 95-100)
Convertible debt: “Are convertible bonds or bonds with warrants part of your financial structure (exclude
arrangements for employees)?” (2 options, yes/no)
Short-term debt: “The short-term debt ratio is debt with a time to maturity of less than one year divided by total
debt. What is in your firm the short-term debt ratio (measured in book values)?” (20 intervals, from 0-4 till 95-100)
(B)
Marginal tax rate: “Assume that the deductibility of interest payments is abolished. To what extent will the amount
of taxes that have to be paid increase?” (7 points scale, very little/very much)
Non-debt tax shield from carry forwards: “Carry forwards reduce future tax payments. What is the size of this effect
of carry forwards for your firm?” (7 points scale, very small/very large)
Non-debt tax shield from depreciation: “Depreciation reduces future tax payments. What is the size of this effect of
depreciation on tax payments for your firm?” (7 points scale, very small/very large)
(C)
Volatility profits: “Are the profits of your firm stable over time?” (7 points scale, very unstable/very stable, inverted)
Volatility sales: “What is the degree of predictability of the sales of your firm for the next three years?” (7 points
scale, very good/very bad, inverted)
Industry risk: “My firm operates in markets where, because of innovations, products and services, age continuously,
and succeed each other rapidly” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Uniqueness towards customers: “The products and services of my firm are easily replaceable by customers for
products and services of another firm.” (7 points scale, fully agree/fully disagree, inverted)
Uniqueness towards employees: “My employees depend upon the continuity of my firm, because it is difficult for
them to find a suitable position in another firm.” (7 points scale, fully agree/fully disagree, inverted)
Importance of quality: “For the products and services of my firm it holds that competition is primarily based on
quality and not on price.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
(D)
Growth opportunities from R&D: “My firm invests much in R&D.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Growth opportunities from marketing: “My firm invests much in marketing.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully
agree)
Collateral value: “Assume that your firm has not secured any of its assets yet. Which part of your assets is suitable
for securitization?” (7 points scale, very small/very large)
(E)
Free cash flow (projects): “My firm has ample opportunity to carry out new, profitable projects.” (7 points scale,
fully disagree/fully agree)
Free cash flow (liquid assets): “My firm has disposal over much liquidity for which there is no clear destination yet.”
(7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Free cash flow (internal funds): “The current and future internal funds are more than sufficient to finance all future
profitable projects.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
(F)
Managerial shareholdings: “Does the management of your firm own shares of the firm?” (7 points scale, very41
little/very much)
Performance-based income: “The part of total income of the management (of which you are a member) that is
determined by the stock price of the firm, is large. (Take e.g. bonuses, shares, and options into consideration.)” (7
points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Managerial option plans: “Does the management of your firm own options or warrants of the firm?” (7 points scale,
very little/very much)
Asymmetric information: “The shareholders of my firm are fully informed about the course of events within the
firm.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Block holdings: “Shares of my firm are to a large extent owned by large shareholders.” (7 points scale, fully
disagree/fully agree)
Bank relationship: “My firm has close and lasting relationships with house bankers.” (7 points scale, fully
disagree/fully agree)
Market for corporate control (threat): “If the management of my firm would function insufficiently, the firm would
be taken over by another firm.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Market for corporate control (barriers): “The current takeover barriers of my firm make a hostile takeover
impossible.” (7 points scale, fully agree/fully disagree, inverted)
(G)
Covenants on dividends: “Are restrictions with respect to dividend payments included in long-term debt contracts?”
(7 points scale, never/always)
Covenants on other contracts: “Are restrictions with respect to concluding other contracts included in long-term
debt contracts?” (7 points scale, never/always)
Covenants on investment decisions: “Are restrictions with respect to investment decisions included in long-term
debt contracts?” (7 points scale, never/always)
Secured debt: “Is security used in long term debt contracts?” (7 points scale, never/always)
(H)
Direct wealth transfer with dividends: “The management of my firm can be successfully approached by the
shareholders to pay out extraordinary cash dividends.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Direct wealth transfer with debt seniority: “My firm will only conclude long-term loans with lower or equal
seniority as the current loans.” (7 points scale, fully agree/fully disagree, inverted)
Asset substitution (problem): “I expect that our shareholders will insist on a more aggressive investment policy, in
case of structural low profits, in the hope of higher profits.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Asset substitution (distress): “Projects of which the uncertainty is unacceptable under normal circumstances, will be
undertaken in case of a threat of bankruptcy.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Underinvestment (problem): “In my firm it might occur that a potentially successful project is not started, because
new shares have to be issued to finance the project.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Underinvestment (distress): “In worse days for the firm our shareholders will be extra reserved with respect to
financing new promising projects.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)
Overinvestment: “In my firm a project is accepted if it is useful to the management’s opinion, even it is expected that
this causes a reduction in the stock price.” (7 points scale, fully disagree/fully agree)42
1. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange makes the Netherlands the country with the eighth largest
stock market capitalization in the world (as of March 31st 1997, The Economist, April 26th
1997).
2. According to a report by Coopers & Lybrand (1990) technical takeover defenses in the
European Community are most severe in the Netherlands. An overview of Dutch takeover
defenses is provided by Kabir, Cantrijn, and Jeunink (1997). Since 1960 only one hostile
takeover took place, i.e. in 1979 Lantana Beheer took over Tilburgse
Waterleidingmaatschappij.
3. All listed firms have a two-tier board system, i.e. a supervisory board is installed to control
the executive board. Kabir, Cantrijn, and Jeunink (1997) find that in the Netherlands, on
average the five largest shareholders own 49% of the shares. For example, Prowse (1992)
finds that the five largest shareholders have in the US on average 25% of the shares.
4. Titman and Wessels (1988) conclude their paper with this problem, stating that “If stronger
linkages between observable indicator variables and the relevant attributes can be developed,
then the methods suggested in this paper can be used to test more precisely the extant theories
of optimal capital structure.” (see p.17). Also Rajan and Zingales (1995) mention this problem
as they conclude “..it is necessary to strengthen the relationships between theoretical models
and empirical specifications of these models. This, we believe, will be possible only with more
detailed data which will enable us to identify more accurate proxies.” (see p.1458).
5. Examples of studies based on questionnaires are Scott and Johnson (1982) and Pinegar and
Wilbricht (1989). For example, Pinegar and Wilbricht ask respondents to give the perceived
importance of several capital structure inputs (such as ‘voting control’ and ‘bankruptcy costs’).
6. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that in case managers are not or only partial owners of
the firm, the costs of the consumption of perquisites are not or partially born by the managers.
Managers can reduce effort or use company funds to their own benefits. Perquisite
consumption is defined as ‘..utility generated by non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial
activities..’ (p.312). Overinvestment is a special case of this problem.
7. It is important to describe the proxies in Titman and Wessels (1988). The first proxy for
uniqueness is a combination of R&D and selling expenses, both over sales, and the industry
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quit rate of employees. The first and second variable in this proxy show close resemblance with
the proxy for growth opportunities. The latter variable is inversely related to uniqueness and
defined as the percentage of workforce that voluntarily left their jobs in the industry in which
the firm operates. The second proxy is a dummy for industries with SIC codes between 3400
and 4000, which are the firms producing machines and other equipment.  
8. This approach is often referred to as LISREL, a software package including confirmatory
factor analysis and structural equations modeling. However, LISREL can be applied for both the
one-step and the two-step approach. See Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989, 1993).
9. Homogeneous questions ask the respondent about a single characteristic. Heterogeneous
questions incorporate multiple characteristics and therefore scores cannot be attributed to
single characteristics. Within a measurement model single characteristics are the indicators for
a latent variable that can be heterogeneous or homogeneous.
10. In this paper we use an estimate of the correlation matrix for S as suggested by Jöreskog
and Sörbom (1993, p.7). Consequently, the correlations are polychoric (two ordinal variables),
polyserial (one ordinal and one continuous variable), or Pearson product moment correlations
(two continuous variables).
11. Following Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989, p.131) we calculate the matrix A that contains the
factor scores as A=M7'E .
-1
12. This method is referred to as mean imputation, see Little and Rubin (1987).
13. As the debt ratio in the questionnaire is measured in 20 intervals, the debt ratios are not
fully comparable. However, using the median of the interval, the average debt ratio is 15.3%.
14. The positions mentioned on these forms generally indicate that the respondent is the person
who is responsible for the firm’s financial management. The positions most frequently
mentioned are CFO (in Dutch: ‘financieel directeur’, 43% of the positions mentioned), CEO
(in Dutch: ‘algemeen directeur’, 20%), and controller (17%).
15. The original questionnaire (in Dutch) is available upon request from the authors. In the
appendix a translation is included.
16. In the first round 81 questionnaires were returned and in the follow-up 21 questionnaires
were returned. 44
17. The questionnaire includes 43 questions. One question is excluded because the variance is
zero. Five other questions are excluded, because the questions are redundant or because, based
upon examination of the results, we suspect these questions to be incorrect. 
18. The results in Table IV concern the final model. In a previous model it was found that the
latent variables risk, uniqueness, market for corporate control, and wealth transfer each had to
be separated into two latent variables, because the hypothesis that the indicators of these latent
variables measure a single construct was rejected. As shown in Table IV, this results in four
pairs of new variables, i.e. firm-specific and industry-specific risk, uniqueness to customers and
uniqueness to employees, corporate control threat and corporate control barriers, and wealth
transfer with dividends and wealth transfer with debt seniority.
19. For this and further conclusions about the significance of coefficients we ignore the
generated variables problem.
20. In Titman and Wessels (1988) uniqueness is measured as a weighted average of relative
R&D expenditures, relative selling expenses, and the voluntary workers’ quit rate in the firm’s
industry. Their factor analysis shows that the latter indicator receives the lowest weight.
Hence, the construct of uniqueness shows a large resemblance with growth opportunities or
intangible assets, and can therefore also be considered as bankruptcy costs.
21. Wealth transfer with dividends or seniority and asset substitution are excluded from the
structural equations model. The correlations of these latent variables with leverage are very
low (see Table VI). Hence, it is unlikely that excluding these variables induces erroneous
interpretations.